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 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

DAVID MEYER, INDIVIDUALLY 

AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS 

PRESIDENT AND DESIGNATED 

OFFICER/BROKER OF TRIAD, 

INC., ETC., 

Petitioner 

v. 

EMMA MARY ELLEN HOLLEY, 

ET VIR, ET AL. 

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 01-1120

:

:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, December 3, 2002

The above-entitled matter came on for oral 
argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at

10:04 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

DOUGLAS G. BENEDON, ESQ., Woodland Hills, California; on

behalf of the Petitioner.

ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, ESQ., Lexington, Kentucky; on behalf

of the Respondents.

MALCOLM L. STEWART, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor

General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on

behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae,
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 supporting the Respondents.
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ORAL ARGUMENT OF 

DOUGLAS G. BENEDON, ESQ.

On behalf of the Petitioner 

ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, ESQ.

On behalf of the Respondents 

MALCOLM L. STEWART, ESQ.

On behalf of the United States, 

PAGE

4

24

as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents 41

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF

DOUGLAS G. BENEDON, ESQ.

On behalf of the Petitioner 51
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 P R O C E E D I N G S

(10:04 a.m.)

JUSTICE STEVENS: We will now hear argument in

Number 01-1120, Meyer against Holley.

Mr. Benedon.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF DOUGLAS G. BENEDON

ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MR. BENEDON: Justice Stevens, and may it please

the Court:

The question -- excuse me. The question

presented should be answered with the following bright

line rule: Imposition of vicarious liability under the

FHA should be determined by application of established

rules of corporate and agency law not criteria unique to

the FHA. 

and officers are not vicariously liable for the torts of

the other agents of the corporation.

Under these principles, corporate shareholders 
The Ninth Circuit held that a different rule

should apply under the FHA, that vicarious liability could

be based on control alone. That is not, nor should it be,

the law. 

While the starting -- the starting point for the

analysis is necessarily the statute itself, while Congress

has authority to expand the class of persons liable for

violation of a Federal law, when it has done so, it has
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done so expressly. The FHA was never -- which neither

defines nor expands the class of persons liable under the

act, and as this Court stated in Bestfoods, this silence

is dispositive.

Specifically, Congress has spoken directly when

it has wished to impose a control test. For example --

QUESTION: Suppose -- suppose that I were to

agree with you and the Court were to agree with you as to

your criticism of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and -- and

that it agreed with you too that general principles of

agency and corporate liability apply. Based on this

record, could we go on to say that under California law

and real estate law generally, the real estate salesman is

the agent of the broker, and therefore the broker is

liable under agency law?

MR. BENEDON: The answer --

QUESTION: Or -- or would I have to -- would we

have to remand before we did that? Because this is

discussed in the -- in the respondents' brief, and the

respondent makes it quite clear. And maybe you disagree,

but the -- the law is cited on page 15 of the red brief,

that under California law, the broker is the principal. 

And I take it the principal would be liable under

respondeat superior in this case. 

MR. BENEDON: Correct, Your Honor. 
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 QUESTION: If -- if we find who the principal

is, we know the principal is going to be liable.

MR. BENEDON: That's where --

QUESTION: Under California law the broker is

the principal.

MR. BENEDON: My -- Your Honor, my answer to

that is -- is several-fold.

First, the distinction needs to be made between

a corporate broker and an individual broker. Mr. Meyer in

this case is a corporate officer who holds a broker's

license solely as the officer of the corporation. The

corporation is the employer of the agent. The agent

operates under the license held by the corporation.

QUESTION: But isn't it fair to say that -- or

isn't it? 

corporation operates as a broker only because it has the

individual's broker license assigned to it.

Maybe you'll take issue with this, that the 
MR. BENEDON: It has to, Your Honor. 

A corporation as a paper person needs human beings to

fulfill the function that a corporation must do, as does

any corporation. There will always be supervising

officers --

QUESTION: Is -- is there any California law

saying that -- that the corporation is the principal in a

situation like this and not the holder of the -- not
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the -- not the named broker?

MR. BENEDON: The named broker, again -- to

answer your question, no, not that I'm aware of.

QUESTION: This -- this is a --

QUESTION: Let me ask the opposite. Is there

any California case in which the named broker in the

corporation has been held liable as the principal solely

because he's the named broker?

MR. BENEDON: Not the designated officer, Your

Honor. The corporation has been held liable.

QUESTION: Yes. That's what I'm talking about.

MR. BENEDON: But not the designated

officer/broker.

QUESTION: So --

QUESTION: 

licenses, the individual license that Justice Kennedy was

referring to and that's mentioned on page 15 of the red

brief, the individual broker license and the statement

that the individual broker licensee is vicariously

liable and the broker who holds the license under the

corporate name? Are those different certificates?

Is there a difference in the 
MR. BENEDON: Absolutely, Your Honor. There are

separate licenses issued by the Department of Real Estate

in California: one to individuals who act as brokers, and

one to individuals who are brokers only in their capacity
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as officers of a corporation. Those are separate

licenses.

The only license in this cases was held by

Mr. Meyer as an officer of the corporation. He could not

step outside the corporation and act as a broker. His

existence as a broker depended on the corporation. He

could not transact --

QUESTION: May I ask you this question? You

explained to Justice Scalia that there is no California

case holding a corporate broker liable in this situation,

as I understand. Are there any California cases going the

other way? Has it ever -- has the issue ever been

presented to the California courts?

MR. BENEDON: Yes, it has, Your Honor. In two

cases, there have been, one -- one State case and one 
district court case cited in our -- in our briefs, in

the -- re Grabau case. They've held that the California

statutory scheme imposes only a disciplinary remedy for

any violations of the scheme such that a broker -- a

designated officer/broker who violates any of the

provisions of the statute may be subject to discipline,

but is not the basis of a civil action. 

QUESTION: So in this case the individual could

be subject to discipline, but not to liability. Is

that --
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 MR. BENEDON: Correct. 

QUESTION: Yes. 

QUESTION: What were your other reasons. You

said you -- you had a multi-faceted answer, or something

like that. What -- what are the other --

MR. BENEDON: The --

QUESTION: -- prongs or the other facets of your

answer? 

MR. BENEDON: The other facets is that liability

under the FHA cannot be premised on California agency law. 

There, the -- the agency under the FHA is determined on

Federal rules of agency. To determine Federal agency,

this Court held in General Contractors, you look to the

Restatement which has a two-prong test. One is the right

of control, but the other is that the person controlled 
has to be acting on behalf of the principal.

Here, the agent works -- is working on behalf of

the corporation. In this case when Mr. Crank went out and

did real estate transactions, he was acting on behalf of

Triad. He was not acting on behalf of Meyer.

The problem with looking at each State's

structure is we're going to end up with a patchwork

construction of a Federal statute. The law may be

different in Nevada than from Oregon than from Washington

than from West Virginia. 
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 QUESTION: Is that --

QUESTION: Suppose it were the majority rule

that a real estate broker is the principal for the

salesman. Would we follow that rule generally? 

MR. BENEDON: Again, Your Honor, the --

QUESTION: And again, I'm -- I'm referring to

the red brief at pages 14 and 15 which sets this -- this

out. You say there's a distinction because there's a

corporate broker and -- and an individual broker.

MR. BENEDON: Correct. 

QUESTION: Now, we -- I -- we can explore that a

little bit. But suppose it were the -- the general rule

in most of the States that had addressed the subject that

the broker is the principal.

MR. BENEDON: 

you still need to make a distinction between individual

brokers and corporate licensed brokers. We do not dispute

that --

To answer that question, I think 
QUESTION: Well, I -- I was simply addressing

the point of whether or not State law as opposed to

Federal law controls. And if it's the general law in most

States that the broker is the principal, then that would

certainly be sufficient for the imposition of liability

under this Federal scheme. Would it not? 

MR. BENEDON: Again, I -- I disagree, Your

10 
Alderson Reporting Company 
1111 14th Street, N.W. Suite 400 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Honor. I would say that the rules still -- you need to

still look at the Federal law of agency rather than how

the State defines the relationship between the broker and

the agent. You -- again, you look to the Federal rules of

agency to determine agency under the FHA. 

QUESTION: I thought you said those were general

common law principles that are -- presumably the States

would share.

MR. BENEDON: The general law principles applied

in the broker/agent context would establish that the

agent -- the sales agent -- is the agent of the principal

broker when the broker is acting in his individual

capacity when the agent is acting on behalf of the

principal, of the individual broker, and subject to that

broker's control. 

officer/broker who is not -- the agent in that situation

is not acting on behalf of the officer. He's acting on

behalf of the corporation.

The situation is different when it's a 
QUESTION: Then if I understand your argument

correctly, you're saying that the discussion, whether it's

California law or Federal common law, is in this case at

least academic because under California law, if you were

to apply it, there is no relief for these plaintiffs, that

the only remedy where it's -- the license is held in the

corporate name is a disciplinary sanction?
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 MR. BENEDON: To date, that is how California

has treated violations of the California statutory scheme. 

Correct, Your Honor. 

QUESTION: Only -- only by these corporate

brokers or -- or by -- by individual brokers?

MR. BENEDON: Excuse me, Your Honor. Individual

brokers as well.

QUESTION: Okay. 

MR. BENEDON: It's a statutory scheme that

applies to brokers in general and salespersons in general

who -- who allegedly violate the act.

QUESTION: But I thought you said that if -- if

this were a license to an individual broker, if this were

held -- the license were held by Meyer as an individual --

that he would then have a principal agent relationship 
with Crank. Is that not so?

MR. BENEDON: That is correct, Your Honor, if

it's an individual broker's license. 

I think I may have caused some confusion. Under

general principles of agency law, common law principles of

agency law, the sales agent is in an agent principal

relationship with an individual broker. If there is a

violation of the act by the broker under California law,

then he would be subject to disciplinary action. That is

separate and apart from vicarious liability under the FHA,
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which would adhere based on the principal agent

relationship. 

QUESTION: Is there an issue in this case about

piercing the corporate veil as a means of holding Meyer

liable?

MR. BENEDON: Not in this case, Your Honor. We

hold that the theory and doctrine of corporate veil-

piercing is -- is available in the appropriate case as it

would be under any case under the general common law,

although here it's been -- it wasn't raised and it's been

waived, and it's never been proven.

QUESTION: But they came --

QUESTION: Was there some reference to

veil-piercing in the respondents' brief in the Ninth

Circuit? 

MR. BENEDON: On the last page of argument in a

footnote, Your Honor, there's a reference arguing that

based on sole ownership, that they could establish an

alter ego, but as a matter of law, that's insufficient to

establish alter ego.

QUESTION: Well, didn't -- refresh my

recollection. Doesn't this come up on a motion for

summary judgment? 

MR. BENEDON: First a motion to dismiss, Your

Honor --
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 QUESTION: Yes. 

MR. BENEDON: -- followed by a --

QUESTION: Which was denied and then there was a

motion for summary judgment. 

MR. BENEDON: The motion for dismiss was granted

in part, Your Honor, as to all the State law claims --

QUESTION: Okay. 

MR. BENEDON: -- the 1981 claim, and it

proceeded just on the FHA claim.

QUESTION: Right. Now, so if it came up on a

motion for summary judgment, then whatever -- whatever

evidence the plaintiffs were going to rely on for the

veil-piercing would have had to have been brought forward. 

Isn't that right? 

MR. BENEDON: Absolutely.

QUESTION: And what did they bring forward? 

MR. BENEDON: Nothing, except sole ownership.

QUESTION: Sole ownership is the only thing --

MR. BENEDON: Which is in dispute. Which is in

dispute. We maintain that ownership was, in fact,

transferred, but we are assuming for the purpose of this

proceeding that there is in fact ownership resided in

Mr. Meyer.

QUESTION: I thought that if -- that a judgment

winner, as the Holleys are at this stage, can defend the
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judgment on another ground. In other words, the Ninth

Circuit ruled in their favor and now they're saying, well,

here's another theory on which we could prevail. I didn't

know -- certainly they can't get an immediate victory, but

if they attempt to defend the judgment on that basis,

aren't they then entitled to go back and make the case

rather than taking from them their victory and saying you

lose? They say, but we have another theory that would be

viable. Up till now, we won with this one. Why isn't

that altogether appropriate they should now be given a

chance to air that other theory in support of the

judgment? 

MR. BENEDON: They -- the theory was never

raised below. An alter ego is in and of itself a fact-

driven inquiry. 

wasn't raised below, it's -- it's now been waived. It

can't be raised for the first time in this Court.

Where it's -- and so the fact that it 
QUESTION: Even if -- even if it had been

raised, my understanding is in -- in order to have it sent

back on the -- on the basis that although the court below

relied on one theory, it could have relied on the other,

the motion for summary judgment put the plaintiff to his

proof to -- to at least come up with facts, the assertion

of facts, not the demonstration of them, but the assertion

of facts that would support the other theory. And the
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only fact contained here is control. So if control is --

does not suffice to pierce veils, that's the end of the

case, it seems to me. 

MR. BENEDON: That's correct. That is correct

and that is our position. 

QUESTION: I thought there were a bunch of

things. I mean, the Government in its brief lists a whole

bunch of things. He was the sole shareholder. He was the

president. He did control it. He paid the taxes in his

own Social Security number. He made various transactions

that violated the terms under which it was supposed to be

the corporate form, and he didn't train the person

properly. I mean, they have a list of things which I take

it they didn't just make up, that they're there in the

record. 

Then -- and then they say that, well, in the

Ninth Circuit brief, what it says in the footnote is that

evidence -- evidence will show that Meyer is the sole

shareholder of Triad, and thus an argument to pierce the

corporate veil would be meritorious. Well, they don't

list all those things in that footnote. That's true. But

we should send it back and let the Ninth Circuit decide.

I guess that's basically their argument, and I

think I want to hear as complete a response to that as --

as you have. Maybe I've heard it already.

16 
Alderson Reporting Company 
1111 14th Street, N.W. Suite 400 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
 MR. BENEDON: No. You -- I would like to

amplify on that, Your Honor. 

The issue of -- of alter ego that's been now

raised for the first time in this -- in this Court by the

Solicitor General is based on speculation beyond the

showing that there was sole ownership and that there is no

insurance coverage. Everything else is unsupported by the

record in terms of establishing that there was a failure

to adhere to corporate formalities, that there was under-

capitalization. All that is speculation. And the

argument boils down --

QUESTION: Was it not even asserted? I mean --

MR. BENEDON: No. 

QUESTION: -- to survive the motion for summary

judgment, you don't have to prove it, but you have to say 
I -- you know, I will prove it.

MR. BENEDON: No, it wasn't --

QUESTION: It wasn't even asserted.

MR. BENEDON: It was not even asserted. It's

asserted for the first time in this Court.

QUESTION: Well, in the footnote -- they mention

it in the footnote. 

MR. BENEDON: They mention sole ownership in the

footnote.

QUESTION: Well, that's -- that's -- you're
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quite right.

MR. BENEDON: Yes. And for example, the --

Your -- Your Honor made reference to payment of taxes. 

While that was alleged, it was never proven at the summary

judgment stage. That's just an allegation in their --

QUESTION: I don't know what that means. While

it was alleged, it was never proven at the summary

judgment stage. 

MR. BENEDON: Right. There's --

QUESTION: There -- there was no evidence

brought in at all to establish it.

MR. BENEDON: That he -- that taxes were paid

under his ID? None whatsoever.

QUESTION: Well, was -- was there an affidavit

on their side claiming that? 

MR. BENEDON: On the other side claiming that?

QUESTION: Yes. How did it get raised?

MR. BENEDON: It was raised solely as a -- as an

allegation in the complaint. And then when it came time

for them to put their proof on the table, it wasn't there.

QUESTION: So at the summary judgment stage,

they didn't rely on that is what you're saying.

MR. BENEDON: Correct.

QUESTION: They didn't. Okay.

MR. BENEDON: Correct.
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 QUESTION: And did you deny it?

MR. BENEDON: Absolutely. Absolutely. But

again, it was not raised as a disputed material fact on

the summary judgment, so there's no formal denial in the

record because it was never raised. I'm denying it now.

QUESTION: And you said there was no genuine

issue -- no triable issue at the summary judgment stage,

that there were no facts?

MR. BENEDON: That there was no issue regarding

payment of taxes under Mr. Meyer's personal ID number.

QUESTION: Well, if the question is the -- the

liability of Mr. Meyer -- and at the summary judgment

stage, it's not a trial. You don't prove your case at

that point. It's only if there's no genuine triable

issue.

MR. BENEDON: Right. The only issue on the

summary judgment was whether or not Mr. Meyer was still

the owner of Triad Corporation. The district court found

not. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that there

was a disputed issue on sole ownership.

QUESTION: But what was the relevance of whether

he was the owner or not? I don't quite understand. 

MR. BENEDON: They're claiming that that was

sufficient to establish alter ego, Your Honor. 

QUESTION: Alter ego, but not piercing the
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corporate veil, is that --

MR. BENEDON: Well, I'm using those

interchangeably. I apologize. 

QUESTION: I'm sorry. I didn't understand you.

MR. BENEDON: I use those interchangeably. 

They -- both alter ego as a basis for piercing the

corporate veil. They were arguing -- and in fact, the

Ninth Circuit held -- that sole ownership of the

corporation was enough to pierce the corporate veil.

QUESTION: They were arguing that. So they were

arguing the pierce the corporate veil theory then.

MR. BENEDON: No. They -- solely based on sole

ownership. Correct.

QUESTION: But the -- but the purpose of

investigating the sole ownership issue was to determine 
whether or not they could pierce the corporate veil. Is

that right? 

MR. BENEDON: Based --

QUESTION: Which seems to me as though their

issue of whether they could pierce the corporate veil was

at least raised, and the question is whether their claim

of sole ownership was sufficient to establish that point. 

Maybe I'm misunderstanding something. 

MR. BENEDON: Right. Well, that -- that's the

argument that's made in their footnote on the last page of
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their brief is that sole ownership would establish an

alter ego sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. And as

a matter of law, that's -- that is insufficient.

QUESTION: But -- but now I'm just a little

puzzled about the extent to which it was raised in the

district court. Was there a debate on the -- in the

district court as to whether your client was the sole

owner or not? 

MR. BENEDON: Yes, there was.

QUESTION: And what was the purpose of that

debate in the district court? Wasn't it for the very same

reason? 

MR. BENEDON: They were trying to -- no, I

disagree. I think what they were trying to establish in

the district court was the -- the control exerted by my 
client over the corporation as opposed to saying that he

should be necessarily a veil-piercing --

QUESTION: Well, maybe I -- I don't remember the

facts correctly. But I thought that control was really

not in dispute. I thought that the -- the person to whom

he transferred stock didn't get all the stock, did he, or

did he get just some of the stock?

MR. BENEDON: He got some of the stock, but

ownership --

QUESTION: So he still would have had control.
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 MR. BENEDON: He would have partial control as

a -- as a shareholder.

QUESTION: I see. 

MR. BENEDON: But the -- the Ninth Circuit held

that that was enough. The court -- the Ninth Circuit --

QUESTION: Not -- not that it was enough for

piercing the veil, but that it was enough for what?

MR. BENEDON: It was enough to impose personal

liability.

QUESTION: On what basis? Not on

veil-piercing --

MR. BENEDON: No.

QUESTION: -- basis.

MR. BENEDON: Solely on sole ownership. They --

the Ninth Circuit, taking a -- its lead from, I believe, 
the Seventh Circuit, said basically that in a situation

like this where you have sole ownership, under the FHA

that's enough to impose --

QUESTION: Okay. You don't have to pierce the

veil.

MR. BENEDON: Correct. It's -- it's an almost

per se piercing based on sole ownership.

QUESTION: But just returning one -- once again

to the broker problem. I'm looking at Gipson versus Davis

Realty, which is a case by Judge -- written by Judge
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Molinari. It's cited on page 15 of the respondents'

brief. That was a standard respondeat superior case where

the broker -- pardon me -- where the salesman is in an

automobile accident and they seek to hold the principal

for the damages caused by the accident within the course

of his employment. And this is the case where the

statement is made that the broker is liable for the

misconduct or -- or malfeasance of -- of the agent in the

course of -- of his employment. 

And it's a case much like this where there's a

corporation that holds the license. There -- there

doesn't seem to be a -- a distinction between the

corporate license and -- and the broker license that you

made. Is that -- was the law changed since the Gipson

case, or --

MR. BENEDON: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor.

Again, I -- I don't have the facts of that case

at -- at the tip of my fingers.

QUESTION: Well, it was relied on in the

respondents' brief. 

MR. BENEDON: Right. But again, in that case I

don't recall if it was a corporate broker or whether it

was an individual broker. But if it was a corporate

broker and they're holding them individually liable for

the torts of the --
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 QUESTION: Well, as I understand the facts of

the case, it was an individual who held the license and he

operated through a corporation. That's -- that's --

MR. BENEDON: Well, again, I would say that what

California decides to do is not what needs -- can be what

determines under the -- the Federal statute. It's been

argued by both sides and the case law is consistent that

it's Federal rules of agency. And under Federal rules of

agency, the salesperson is the agent of the corporation,

not the individual broker.

If there are no further questions, I would just

like to conclude and save the rest -- the remainder of my

time for rebuttal. 

QUESTION: Very well.

Mr. Schwemm.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF ROBERT G. SCHWEMM

ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

MR. SCHWEMM: Justice Stevens, and may it please

the Court:

I'd like to begin by addressing the

veil-piercing and the preserving issue, particularly with

respect to Justice Scalia's question because I disagree

with my learned friend on the procedural posture of this

case. 

There was a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. In the
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complaint at that time, there were essentially two

theories. The complaint said that Mr. Meyer should be

liable as an individual because he owned the corporation,

and the complaint also said that Mr. Meyer should be

liable because he was the officer/broker.

The district court granted in part, even with

respect to the Fair Housing Act claim, the 12(b)(6) motion

and, in particular, held that the allegations of the

complaint with respect to ownership under no circumstances

could lead to liability. And the only thing that the

district court did not grant 12(b)(6) on was the issue

with respect to liability based on officer/broker. 

That led to discovery. The district court then

granted summary judgment because it was the district

court's theory on that issue that there could not be 
liability unless Mr. Meyer held an individual broker's

license as opposed to what he holds in this case, which is

a license through Triad, or more properly, according to

the California law, Triad holds the license through him.

So with all respect, what the district court

held in the 12(b)(6) motion was that no set of facts that

the plaintiffs could prove could justify veil-piercing. 

We never got --

QUESTION: Well, could prove or -- or claimed

they could prove in response to the motion. I mean,
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you -- you don't have to sit back and say, I wonder what

they might be able to prove. You -- you have to have made

an offer of proof, and -- and what the court held was that

none of the facts that you claimed you could prove would

suffice. Isn't that an accurate description of -- of

what -- what the holding of the court was?

MR. SCHWEMM: And the facts that we alleged were

that Mr. Meyer was the sole owner of the corporation,

which they denied, and that that was sufficient to impose

individual liability. And when the district court granted

12(b)(6) motion, my understanding of that is that he is

saying, under no set of facts will you ever win. 

Now, what would --

QUESTION: -- isn't that true that -- that you

have to have something more than simply a person being a 
sole owner of a corporation? Otherwise a person couldn't

create a corporation with himself as a 100 percent owner.

MR. SCHWEMM: Absolutely. 

QUESTION: All right. So they're -- what

they're saying is you didn't allege anything than that,

and you certainly didn't support anything other than that

with affidavits or other -- or other offers of proof.

MR. SCHWEMM: That's -- that was my point --

QUESTION: Yes. 

MR. SCHWEMM: -- with respect to the summary
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judgment. 

QUESTION: All right. Well, if you -- if you

didn't, then you're out of luck, aren't you?

MR. SCHWEMM: I don't think so because --

QUESTION: Because? 

MR. SCHWEMM: -- at the 12(b)(6) motion stage,

we are told that you can't even --

QUESTION: No, no. I'm not saying 12(b)(6). 

I mean on summary judgment. 

MR. SCHWEMM: Yes. If my learned friend was

right that this was a summary judgment dismissal of that

claim, I might agree. But that's not right.

We were stopped at the very pleadings stage. We

were prepared to show both of the key factors with respect

to veil-piercing, which is that the corporation is heavily 
underfunded. In fact, in a colloquy with the district

court, the defendant's counsel, after the 12(b)(6) motion,

Your Honor, when the only thing left was the summary

judgment with respect to the broker situation, the

district court said, is there any money in the company? 

And the defendant's lawyer said, no, there is not.

QUESTION: Okay. I have your complaint here on

page 16 and 17 of the joint appendix. First claim, Fair

Housing Act. I don't see anything there about -- about

veil-piercing or anything like that. Where -- where is it
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in the complaint?

MR. SCHWEMM: Correct, Your Honor. The -- the

phrase veil-piercing is not mentioned --

QUESTION: No, no. Or anything even vaguely

like that. I mean, what it seems to say is that Mr. Meyer

himself did all these things, or through his agent. Now,

that's -- that's what it says.

MR. SCHWEMM: The allegation, if I could refer

Your Honor to page 4 of the joint appendix in paragraph 6

of the complaint, says that he owned the corporation and

on that basis he's individually liable. And then it goes

on and says he also was the officer/broker of the

corporation, which is the other theory --

QUESTION: Yes, I see where it says he owned the

corporation. 

therefore he is liable because he owned it. I mean, it

just seems to be the part where you're describing the

parties.

What I don't see is something that says, and 
MR. SCHWEMM: There is another part, Your Honor. 

Page 7 of the joint appendix, paragraph 13, which carries

over to page 8. Essentially the same thing. I'm not

suggesting that there is additional material there, but

there is the allegation of ownership leading to personal

liability.

QUESTION: No. I mean -- to be honest with you,
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I'm not -- I'm just debating with myself whether you -- we

should send this back to the Ninth Circuit, tell them work

this out or not. And district court judges are not

mind-readers. They -- they can't make up what you're

saying in a complaint unless you say it and unless you

argue it. So -- so that's why I'm pressing you on this. 

I'm -- I'm trying to find the particular point where you

really made this point to the district court so the judge

would focus on it and make a decision.

MR. SCHWEMM: Well, I wish it was more detailed,

Your Honor, but it seems to me it's sufficient for notice

pleading. The district court understood it. The

defendants understood it.

QUESTION: Well, he didn't seem to, in his

opinion, understand it because the only reference he has 
to veil-piercing seems in a footnote in a paragraph. And

what he seems to be saying there is referring to a

different argument, the argument that there could be no

veil-piercing because he didn't even own this corporation.

And he says, that -- that's really wrong. It's not true. 

Or maybe he said it was right, but he was wrong if he said

it was right.

MR. SCHWEMM: And that's at the 12(b)(6) stage. 

And -- and my understanding of that is he is saying, I'm

not going to get you -- let you go forward to your proof
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because under no circumstances can there be veil-piercing

under the Fair Housing Act, which is just wrong.

QUESTION: This was at the summary judgment

stage?

MR. SCHWEMM: No, sir. On page 32, which is the

district court's order, page 32 to the joint appendix,

which is the district court's order --

QUESTION: 32 of the joint appendix. 

MR. SCHWEMM: Yes, Your Honor. It actually

starts as an opinion on page 25 of the joint appendix.

This is the district court's order granting in part the

12(b)(6) motion. He doesn't allow going forward at the

12(b)(6) stage the claim based on ownership. He allows

going forward the claim based on corporate broker, and he

specifically refers to a case -- this is the 12(b)(6) 
decision -- that talks about veil-piercing. Page 32 of

the joint appendix in the footnote. 

Now, our point is that that's enough for notice

pleading. The defendants understood what was going on. 

The judge understood what was going on. We were

prepared -- certainly at the summary judgment stage,

Justice Scalia, we would -- we would have been happy to go

forward with proof of underfunding, and there is

substantial proof of underfunding. We would have been

happy to go forward with proof of lack of corporate
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formalities. This is a company --

QUESTION: Well, had you alleged any of these

things? I mean, opposing counsel referred in his argument

to an allegation that the individual taxpayer ID number

was being used. Did you allege that in -- in the

complaint somewhere?

MR. SCHWEMM: That we did allege.

QUESTION: Okay. Where is it? I mean, this is

what we're fishing for. Did you allege anything beyond

the mere claim of sole ownership?

MR. SCHWEMM: Page 7 of the joint appendix, Your

Honor, paragraph 13 toward the bottom of the page. After

it's been alleged that Triad was owned by Mr. Meyer --

QUESTION: Yes. I got it.

MR. SCHWEMM: Got it? 

QUESTION: Yes.

Did you allege anything -- I mean, okay, we've

got sole ownership. We've got taxpayer ID. Did you

allege anything else that might be a basis for piercing

the veil? 

MR. SCHWEMM: We -- we did not allege the

details of that. That is to say, we did not allege

underfunding, and we did not allege lack of corporate

formalities. But it seems to me that's not required under

Conley versus Gibson. There is notice pleading, and then
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we are put to our proof if that had been permitted to go

forward to the summary judgment stage. 

QUESTION: You're -- the point you're making is

that you are not certainly required under the Federal

rules to set out your -- any theory of the pleadings. You

just have to state facts showing that there's a claim for

relief.

MR. SCHWEMM: That's exactly right, Your Honor. 

And it seems to me in a case decided by this Court in the

mid-'90s -- I believe it was Peacock -- the Court said

veil-piercing is really not a new claim. It is a theory

of relief. We have claimed Fair Housing Act liability in

the complaint based on these --

QUESTION: Mr. Schwemm, can I ask you this

question? 
 We really didn't grant certiorari to decide --
MR. SCHWEMM: Yes. 

QUESTION: -- a California question as esoteric

as this one is. And I'm just wondering, do you defend the

rationale of the Ninth Circuit and do you defend the -- do

you abandon reliance on any Federal defense here?

MR. SCHWEMM: Our position --

QUESTION: Or Federal regulation. 

MR. SCHWEMM: -- is that the Ninth Circuit's

judgment was correct, but it went too far when it reached

out and said under the Fair Housing Act we have to go
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beyond traditional principles of agency. We think the

standard should be, just as it is under Title VII, the

employment discrimination law, in Kolstad, Burlington

Industries, and Faragher, that the standard for vicarious

liability under the Federal statute should be a Federal

standard. And that standard should be traditional agency

principles as informed by the policies of the Fair Housing

Act. 

Now, the Ninth Circuit apparently felt that they

had to go beyond traditional agency principles. What

we've tried to do in the brief in Roman numerals I, II,

and III is point out three separate and independent

alternative theories under traditional agency principles. 

And in that sense, we -- we think the Ninth Circuit just

reached out and tried to do something that wasn't 
necessary. 

QUESTION: Well, then is your piercing-of-

corporate-veil theory a Federal theory or a State law

theory? 

MR. SCHWEMM: Our position on that is that it's

probably Federal law, but as I read Bestfoods, the Court

hasn't specifically determined, and if I may say that

this -- this is something that I don't have a position on. 

But either way, we are entitled to a remand whether it's

Federal or California law. But the cause of action
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clearly is the Fair Housing Act.

I believe the Government takes the position --

and we certainly don't disagree with the Government --

that it is a Federal question. 

And if I may, I want to get into those parts I,

II, and III of our brief, and particularly the first part

and vicarious liability. 

The problem we have with petitioner's argument

is that I believe it's based on two faulty assumptions. 

One is that petitioner wants to take certain parts of the

California corporation and real estate law that are

advantageous to him, but he doesn't want to take the other

part, which is the responsibility part. It is literally

true that in California, a corporation can be a broker,

but it cannot be a broker unless there is an individual 
appointed who is an officer of the corporation and has

qualified under the broker requirements, and that

individual is required by California law to take

responsibility for the supervision and control of the

agency. 

QUESTION: Yes, but your opponent says that

the -- the results under California law is he can be

disciplined if he fails to do so, but there are no

California cases holding him personally liable if he fails

to do so.
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 MR. SCHWEMM: Our position is that that may be

right, it may be wrong. We believe this is a Federal

standard.

QUESTION: Do you think it's right or wrong?

MR. SCHWEMM: If we got a remand, Your Honor, we

would very much like the opportunity on this basis to

argue that it's wrong. There is a California case in 1978

that holds that, but a year later, California amends its

licensing statute to add the very key provision in this

case which is 10159.2 which says that the individual who's

appointed by the corporation as the officer/broker has

personal responsibility. So our argument would be on

remand that that change. 

But I want to -- I want to make the point

that --

QUESTION: Well, can -- can I go back to an

earlier point you made. You said that California law says

that the corporate broker, the -- the one who's designated

for the corporation, has to exercise control over the --

over the brokers in the corporation. That may well be

true.

The -- the issue is not whether he -- he has to

exercise control. It's whether he exercises control in

his personal status or rather exercises control as an

officer of the corporation. If it's in the latter
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capacity that he exercises control, he -- he should not

have personal liability. It's the corporation that has

liability.

MR. SCHWEMM: Well --

QUESTION: Now, as I understand the California

law, this broker could not operate under that license on

his own. The only way he could use that license was as an

officer of the corporation. Isn't that correct?

MR. SCHWEMM: I would put it actually a little

differently. If you divide the corporation from

Mr. Meyer, Mr. Meyer can then apply, because he's

qualified, to become a broker. Currently he would have to

file a paper, but he would clearly get the status. But

Triad, Inc. would cease at that moment being able to be a

broker. 

salesman's acts, could have been performed under the

rubric of Triad.

And none of the acts in this case, none of the 
And the other point that I was going to make

about the petitioner's argument that I think is faulty is

it's the assumption that if Triad, Inc. is the principal

of these agents, nobody else can be the principal of these

agents. And that's clearly inconsistent with longstanding

agency principles as reflected in the Restatement,

section 20, comment f, which says there can be joint

principals.
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 QUESTION: Well, yes, but -- sure, of course,

there can. But -- but it's not -- it's corporation law

that -- that the officers of the corporation are not one

of those other principals.

MR. SCHWEMM: Ordinarily, Your Honor, but not in

this case. I -- I repeat. This company cannot be a

broker if it doesn't have a broker-qualified individual

who takes responsibility for the agents. And so --

QUESTION: Do you think the Gipson case that you

cited in your brief is on all fours with your case?

MR. SCHWEMM: No, Your Honor, it's not on all

fours. I believe what it says is if the broker is

operating as a sole proprietorship, as an individual, he

clearly is vicariously liable. That is, by the way, what

86 percent of the brokers in California do. They operate

as sole proprietors, and they are clearly vicariously

liable. There is a -- an additional question. What

happens when you incorporate? And -- and so it's not

exactly on all fours. 

And I think the -- the jury is out or the judges

are out with -- with respect to what California would do. 

Some States say in addition to the corporation, the

individual is vicariously liable; some don't. 

QUESTION: Well, so that means you can't have a

corporation. If -- if you want to run a real estate
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corporation, you can't do it because there has to be a

broker's license, and you're going to be personally

liable. What's the use of having a corporation then?

MR. SCHWEMM: There are many uses, Your Honor,

and I would like to address that. 

The only thing that we are arguing that

Mr. Meyer was responsible for is what I would call the

licensed activities. For example, if a broker went out on

the way to a meeting and negligently drove his car and

caused an accident, that is not the kind of behavior

that's subject to broker supervision. And that would be

no liability.

QUESTION: Well, but if he defrauds a client or,

I mean, anything that's going to involve big money on the

part of the corporation is going to come back on the head 
of the individual broker. So you're saying if you want to

be in the brokerage business, you cannot do it as a

practical matter in the corporate form.

MR. SCHWEMM: Only I'm not saying it, Your

Honor. 

QUESTION: That's -- well, no. That -- that's

what you say the California law says.

MR. SCHWEMM: Yes. And every State -- I want to

make this point. Every single State says this. 11 States

say you can't even operate as a broker as a corporate
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form. 39 States, including California, said we will allow

you to do this, but there has to be one human being that

is responsible. 

And in this particular case, there came a point

when Mr. Meyer was trying to get the Triad license

extended. California said you haven't satisfied that

because you personally, Meyer, haven't engaged in the

continuing education requirements that an officer/broker

is required --

QUESTION: That's even tougher than -- than what

most States provide for lawyers.

MR. SCHWEMM: It's very analogous to lawyers,

Your Honor. 

QUESTION: No. It isn't analogous at all. 

Lawyers -- lawyers can -- can avoid personal liability. 
QUESTION: California doesn't give personal

liability there, does it? I mean, my statute here says

there's an officer who's designated by a corporate broker

license, and that officer is responsible for supervision

and control of activities conducted on behalf of the

corporation. So that suggests that he's conducting that

supervision on behalf of the corporation, and so it's the

corporation that would respond in -- in -- under the

principle of respondeat superior.

MR. SCHWEMM: Let me --
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 QUESTION: Evidently that's what California has

held, and given the wording, it seems reasonable.

MR. SCHWEMM: Well, it held that and then

California's legislature came along and added -- added the

requirements. 

But let me -- let me make this observation: 

When Mr. Crank, the salesperson in this case, wanted to

extend his salesperson's license, he was required to have

his broker authorize the forms. This was done four times

by Mr. Meyer. If you look at the form -- joint appendix

lodging 75 is the most recent example, but there are three

other examples -- the California form says, list the

company. Triad. And then requires the officer/broker,

Meyer in this case, to sign a certification which

specifically says, I certify this salesperson is employed 
by me.

QUESTION: I only have 74 pages in my joint

appendix. You said it was joint --

MR. SCHWEMM: I'm sorry. I -- I misspoke. 

Joint appendix lodging, Your Honor. 

QUESTION: Oh.

MR. SCHWEMM: It's the large tan one. 

QUESTION: Got you. 

MR. SCHWEMM: And this was done, by the way, for

Mr. Crank on four different occasions. 
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 What I'm trying to -- to say is this is a

classic case of joint principal. There aren't -- that

isn't true, Justice Scalia, in -- in every corporate

situation. Of course, not. We don't argue that. We

argue that this is a responsible human being and that that

makes him liable --

QUESTION: On the major question that we took

the case to decide, what -- what's the general rule --

well, we can ask the Government -- what the general rule

for when we look to State law and when we look to Federal

law. Certainly State law informs what the Federal law

ought to be. That's -- that's Faragher and Burlington.

MR. SCHWEMM: That would be my response as well.

We have a -- a Federal standard informed by State law.

QUESTION: 

MR. SCHWEMM: Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Schwemm. 
QUESTION: Mr. Stewart.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART

ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES,

AS AMICUS CURIAE, SUPPORTING THE RESPONDENTS

MR. STEWART: Thank you, Justice Stevens, and

may it please the Court:

As this case has been briefed in this Court,

it's common ground among the parties and the United States

that questions of vicarious liability under the Fair
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Housing Act are to be decided on the basis of generally

applicable principles of agency and corporate law rather

than by reference to a rule that's distinct to the FHA. 

And obviously, it is a -- an important general principle

of corporate law.

QUESTION: Well, do we look to general Federal

common law agency principles, or are we bound by State

agency law, Mr. Stewart? 

MR. STEWART: I think the Court -- I'm sorry. 

I think the task for the Court would to -- be to devise a

uniform nationwide rule. That's what the Court said --

But certainly the Court will look as -- as in

Faragher and in Ellerth, the Court looked to the

Restatement of Agency which for the most part is a

compilation of decisions rendered by State courts. So

it's -- it's looking to the law of the States generally,

but it's not looking to the law of a particular State. So

with respect to our veil-piercing argument, we would say

that the Court should devise a uniform Federal --

QUESTION: Well, do you think it's fair to read

the complaint that was filed as putting anyone on notice

that it was a veil-piercing case?

MR. STEWART: We think that the claim was

adequately raised in the district court.

QUESTION: Where?
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 MR. STEWART: The --

QUESTION: Could you read it to us?

MR. STEWART: The -- the plaintiffs --

QUESTION: Because it's not clear to me.

MR. STEWART: The plaintiffs --

QUESTION: I don't think if I read that

complaint, I would read it as one that was proceeding on a

veil-piercing theory.

MR. STEWART: Well, the --

QUESTION: I would have thought it was

proceeding on the designated broker theory. 

MR. STEWART: Well, the plaintiffs -- the

plaintiffs didn't use the phrase, veil-piercing, but on

page of the joint appendix, for instance, they alleged

that Mr. Meyer is the designated officer/broker of Triad, 
the president of Triad. They also alleged that

Mr. Meyer -- they alleged that Mr. Meyer was the sole

shareholder of Triad. In addition, as Mr. Schwemm pointed

out --

QUESTION: But that would be consistent with a

corporation that's wholly adequately funded and -- and

whose -- which -- whose veil cannot be pierced.

MR. STEWART: And it's true that they -- they

didn't allege in the complaint inadequate capitalization. 

However, as Mr. Schwemm pointed out, there was a colloquy
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in the district court in which the petitioner's counsel

appeared to acknowledge that the corporation was without

assets. And --

QUESTION: But it isn't -- I mean, look. The

judge is sitting there on a motion to dismiss the

complaint, and he reads the complaint. And when he reads

the complaint, he looks to claims, and he sees first

claim, Fair Housing Act, which doesn't have a word about

this theory. And apparently in the brief, a different

theory was produced, the one that's been produced today,

that the reason they're liable is not because we want to

pierce the veil, but because it's Mr. Meyer who's really

the holder of the license in some sense, and that is

sufficient. 

So not surprisingly, the district court says 
that. He says any liability against Meyer as an officer

of Triad would attach only to Triad in that plaintiffs

have not urged theories that could justify reaching Meyer

individually, with one exception. And he then goes and

discusses the exception. Well, if I were a district

judge, I would have thought I had done my job at that

point unless somebody came in and petitioned for rehearing

and said, judge, you missed something, which no one did.

MR. STEWART: I think you're right that the

primary theory that the respondents advocated in the
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district court was based on Mr. Meyer's --

QUESTION: No. Sole. Let's try sole theory.

MR. STEWART: Well, this -- this was raised and

disputed in the Ninth Circuit; that is --

QUESTION: In the footnote.

MR. STEWART: Not just in the footnote. In the

Ninth Circuit at page 7 and 8 of the petition appendix,

the Ninth Circuit having turned to the possible liability

of Mr. Meyer as the shareholder of Triad. And the Ninth

Circuit said petitioner Meyer disputes that he was sued in

that capacity. However, the Ninth Circuit goes on to

hold, we disagree. We think that claim was adequately

raised in the district court. 

QUESTION: Of -- of course, what was raised is

we get Meyer because Meyer holds the license, and even 
though it's held in the name of the corporation, that

really doesn't matter. 

MR. STEWART: No. But the Ninth Circuit clearly

understood the claim against Meyer as shareholder to be

distinct from or at least in addition to the claim against

Meyer as designated officer/broker. 

That is, what -- what seems to us to make this a

paradigmatic case for veil-piercing, taking the facts --

QUESTION: Well, maybe it is.

MR. STEWART: -- in the light most favorable to
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the respondent, is the combination of functions that

Mr. Meyer played. 

Now, it's true that the respondent by and large

and the Ninth Circuit appeared to regard these distinct

functions as separate and independent bases for liability. 

But in our view, it's only a short step to say even if no

one of the roles that Mr. Meyer played would be an

independently sufficient ground for imposing personal

liability, the combination of functions, together with the

inadequate -- apparent inadequate capitalization --

QUESTION: Mr. Stewart, as -- as I understand

the theory of why the failure to bring forward affidavits

or some -- some evidentiary proof of these matters at the

summary judgment stage was not necessary, as I understand

it, the plaintiffs' theory is it wasn't necessary because 
the piercing-the-veil portion of the complaint never made

it to the summary judgment stage. It had been dismissed

on the face of the complaint. Is that correct?

MR. STEWART: That is correct. 

QUESTION: Now, was there an appeal of that

dismissal on the face of the complaint? 

MR. STEWART: The -- the ultimate -- there was

not a separate appeal, but the ultimate appeal that went

to the Ninth Circuit was an appeal both from the dismissal

of certain portions of the complaint and from the grant of
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summary judgment with respect to --

QUESTION: What portion? Was -- it was an

appeal of the -- of the portion of the complaint that

dismissed -- dismissed a -- a veil-piercing --

MR. STEWART: It was not specific. The -- the

appeal from the dismissal was with regard to Mr. Meyer's

potential liability as shareholder and the appeal from the

grant of summary judgment with regard to his potential

liability as designated officer/broker was based on the

grant of summary judgment. 

QUESTION: Well, so in addition to the complaint

being very vague, the -- the appeal of the dismissal was

pretty vague too. I -- I don't understand what -- I mean,

if you were objecting to the dismissal of the -- of -- of

a veil-piercing theory, you -- you should have, it seems 
to me, come forward and say, I object to dismissal of that

theory.

MR. STEWART: I would acknowledge that the

theory that -- that we and the respondents have -- the

veil-piercing theory that we have advanced in this Court

is a refinement of what was said in the Ninth Circuit. 

But it's -- it's always been part of the case that

Mr. Meyer's liability was alleged on the basis of his

status as shareholder, his status as designated

officer/broker, his status as president. And again, the
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claim in the Ninth Circuit tended -- tended to be more

that these were independent bases for liability. And our

view is that no one of them would be sufficient in and of

itself. Taken together, they establish that Mr. Meyer

exercised pervasive control over --

QUESTION: Mr. Stewart, I'm -- I'm confused

about one procedural point. Was there not a final

judgment in the district court --

MR. STEWART: There -- there --

QUESTION: -- at the end of the rope, one final

judgment that says that defendant wins and then you --

from that final judgment you can take up all the rulings

against the verdict -- the -- the judgment loser?

MR. STEWART: That -- that's correct. The

district judge first threw out on 12(b)(6) everything 
except the claim against Mr. Meyer as designated

officer/broker, and subsequently entered summary judgment

for the petitioner on that claim. And then there was a

final judgment and that was taken up to the Ninth Circuit.

QUESTION: And the final judgment would include

all the rulings on the way to that final judgment

disposing of the entire case.

MR. STEWART: That -- that's correct. 

Now, in the course of doing discovery on the

designated officer/broker question, they -- the plaintiffs
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unearthed some facts that are potentially relevant to the

veil-piercing theory, but they've had no discovery on

veil-piercing as such. 

And another important criterion in determining

whether veil-piercing is appropriate is whether the

individual bears some degree of personal fault for the

wrong alleged. And here, the plaintiffs' allegation is

that Mr. Meyer negligently supervised Mr. Crank, that that

was a contributing factor in Crank's ultimate misconduct,

and that would suffice to show that aspect of the

veil-piercing analysis. 

I think it's also important to note that courts

are typically more willing to pierce the veil in tort

cases than in contract cases; that this Court has

described the Fair Housing Act as -- as essentially 
defining a new type of tort. The theory is that in

contract cases, an individual who contracts with a

corporation has his own opportunity to assess the -- the

corporation's finances and decline to do business if the

corporation seems likely not to be able to satisfy its

obligations whereas in a tort case the -- the potential

plaintiff has no opportunity to do that.

Inadequate capitalization has always been an

important factor in veil-piercing analysis, and really it

goes to the question whether the incorporators have
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adequately respected the independent status of the

corporate entity.

QUESTION: You don't -- you don't rely in your

submission on the proposition that under California law,

the broker is liable. 

MR. STEWART: We -- we don't. That --

QUESTION: And is that because you accept the

distinction between a corporate broker -- a broker's

license which is in the corporation?

MR. STEWART: I think it's partly that. I think

it's partly just the general background rule is individual

supervisors are ordinarily not vicariously liable for

torts committed by the people they supervise.

QUESTION: Suppose in a majority of the States,

the broker is liable for the -- I forget the --
intervening corporate -- suppose in a majority of the

States, the broker is liable for the acts of the

salesperson.

MR. STEWART: May I answer?

QUESTION: Yes. 

MR. STEWART: If a consensus developed among the

States that designated officers/brokers were sufficiently

different from ordinary supervisors that they should be

held vicariously liable, then we would advocate that as

the general Federal rule. But the respondent has not
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established that there is such a consensus.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Benedon, you have 7 minutes left.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DOUGLAS G. BENEDON

ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MR. BENEDON: Your Honors, I would submit at

this point unless there are any further questions. 

QUESTION: Thank you. 

QUESTION: I --

QUESTION: Oh, excuse me.

QUESTION: I do have -- I'm still -- what is --

what is your response to the -- to the assertion that it

was not necessary for the plaintiffs to bring forward any

affidavits or evidence at the summary judgment stage

because on the -- on the veil-piercing issue -- because 
that issue was no longer alive at the -- at the summary

judgment stage. It had been dismissed on the complaint.

MR. BENEDON: I would start from the premise

that the veil-piercing theory was never born, not that it

wasn't alive. Okay?

QUESTION: In other words, you -- you concede

that then and -- and you -- you fall back on -- on the

simple fact that the veil-piercing theory was never -- was

never really contained in the complaint. 

MR. BENEDON: Never contained in the complaint,
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never raised --

QUESTION: But it is actually. I mean, it says

that -- that the -- the defendant violated the Fair

Housing Act when his agent discriminated. That's what it

says in paragraph 41. 

And then previously in paragraph 13, it lists a

whole lot of facts about the relationship of Mr. Meyer to

the company including the fact about the tax numbers and

so forth. 

And so what they say is, you know, the complaint

doesn't have to spell out every theory, but it does state

some facts there from which this basis could be fairly

inferred, and therefore it shouldn't have been dismissed. 

Rather, they should have had at least an opportunity to

argue it. 

claim. 

I -- I take it something like that is their 
MR. BENEDON: But again, we have to look at what

are the allegations in the complaint.

QUESTION: Well, the allegations are just what I

had said, paragraph --

MR. BENEDON: There --

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. BENEDON: There are allegations of sole

ownership, corporate -- that he was the sole owner, that

he was the officer/broker, and that he was the president,
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and that the taxes were paid under his ID number, an

allegation that's never been proven. 

I think most telling to what was the issue in

this case is the holding of the Ninth Circuit itself, and

that's at page 67 of the joint appendix where the court of

appeals states where common ownership and management

exists, corporate formalities must not be rigidly adhered

to, a holding which is clearly erroneous, but which sets

out what was the issue in this case. The issue was not

under-capitalization. The issue was not mismanagement of

corporate formalities. The issue is -- was could

Mr. Meyer as an individual be held liable because he was

the sole owner, president, and designated broker of

Triad -- Triad Realty. Excuse me.

And for that reason, the Ninth Circuit should be 
reversed and the judgment of the district court in favor

of Mr. Meyer reinstated in full.

JUSTICE STEVENS: Thank you, Mr. Benedon.

The case is submitted. 

(Whereupon, at 11:01 a.m., the case in the

above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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